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1. Introduction 
From the beginning social psychology has concerned itself, from different perspectives, with 
processes of social influence, producing an imposing amount of research. Given this vastity 
and heterogeneity, it is opportune to restrict the sphere of these studies, to understand 
better their specific nature. Social influence can be assessed in all situations where there are 
two “social entities” (two people, two groups, a person and a group), where one is the 
source of influence and the other the target; both interact through an “object” which can be 
an opinion or a behaviour. The purpose of these studies is to reveal whether the reactions of 
people faced with a certain social object can change in terms of the relationship engaged in 
and how, in the present chapter, to what the phenomena of conformism and obedience are 
connected. 
Conformism can be defined as the change in thinking, feeling or acting following pressure, 
real or imaginary, exercised by the group (Moghaddam, 1998). Obedience is instead that 
modification that is manifested carrying out the instructions issued by figures given 
authority. The two phenomena are connected (often conformism is a mental direction more 
easily inclined towards obedience) and both imply the themes of independence and 
submission. For sure living in a society we develop a sense of dependence on others as 
regards the way of understanding and acting in social reality. We can sometimes reach an 
authentic shared consensus, other times no. There are situations in which we cannot freely 
express our ideas, and this activates our resources in order to affirm ourselves and our 
values. Instead others can resign themselves and become submissive, even coming to the 
point of aligning themselves with their oppressor. Analyzing similar situations enables us to 
distinguish the presence or the forming of binding forces in the social environment, just like 
the forces that individual people put into action to resist coercion. 
Conformism and obedience are not necessarily negative phenomena. The list of their 
positive aspects is decidedly long. In fact, without conformism and obedience social life 
would be governed by chaos. We could not circulate in the streets nor even hold a civil 
conversation. However in the present chapter we shall concern ourselves mainly with their 
negative consequences. Starting from the analysis of what is the basis of conformism and 
obedience: the formation of social norms. 
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2. Conformism 
A social norm is generally an accepted way of thinking, feeling or acting, emphasized and 
expected by members of a particular community or social group since it is considered the 
right thing (Turner, 1991). A norm is the standard of reference for judging what is correct 
and appropriate to do in specific situations, providing people with criteria of validity and 
reducing their sense of uncertainty. Therefore norms exercise their own influence on people 
in terms of how to perceive social reality (the function of understanding) and how to behave 
inside social reality (axiological function). 
First research on interaction in small groups has demonstrated that when called to express 
judgment, people tend to develop a certain agreement. For Sherif (1936) this agreement is 
the equivalent of the formation of social norms. In one of his classic studies he used an 
optical illusion called “autokinetic effect”: in a completely dark room, fixing on a 
luminous point the sensation is created, though immobile, that it begins to move 
irregularly. The participants in Sherif's experiment, placed in this ambiguous situation 
and assigned with the task of estimating the width of movement of the luminous 
stimulant, manifested a progressive tendency to establish a common rule, producing a 
convergence in their judgment. A mutual adaptation that may be interpreted as the 
internalization of a social norm, a framework of common reference that establishes 
judgment and reduces uncertainty. 
Something analogous is present in the work of Leon Festinger (1950), where conformity is 
seen as pressure towards the uniformity that the group exercises on its members. A 
uniformity that, excluding deviants, favours the cohesion of the group. But probably the 
most brilliant demonstration of pressure towards conformism is retraced in the pioneer 
studies of Solomon Asch (1951). 
2.1 Independence and submission to judgment 
The experimental context provided by Asch (1956) was simple: a length comparison task 
was proposed for the participants. They were placed in front of two white cardboards: on 
the left one there was a single line (the sample line) and on the right one were three other 
lines. They had to indicate which of the three lines was the same length as the sample line. 
Once all participants had formulated their judgment the two cardboards were replaced by 
another two, again with a sample line and three lines to compare. The sequence foresaw 12 
evaluations. The difference between the line and the other two different lines was so marked 
that it was unmistakably visible. 
The experiment proceeded regularly for the first two trials. Being quite simple judgments, 
the response was the same for all participants. But during the third trial and in subsequent 
ones some changes occurred: the members of the group, except for one (usually situated in 
the last but one place in the row), were in reality accomplices in the experiment and had the 
task of providing the seven judgments clearly contrary to the perceptive evidence. The 
group involved in the experiment was thus composed of two types of participant: a majority 
of people aware of the characteristics and of the results of the experiment and a minority 
(just one participant) unaware of anything. As was immediately intuitable, the real 
“experimental subject” (the “critical subject”, according to terminology used by Asch) had to 
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confront a highly problematic condition. On the one hand the task appeared very simple, as 
it was easily perceptible which of the three lines was the same length as the sample; on the 
other hand the situation was disorientated since the accomplices claimed to have completely 
different perceptions from those suggested by the senses.  
Since he had to express his own opinion after theirs, the critical subject suffered the pressure 
of the majority and therefore was faced with a dilemma: would he have to express without 
wavering what he really saw, thus showing his own disagreement with respect to the rest of 
the group, or provide the same response given by the others, conforming in this way to 
general opinion? 
Results proved that, while in a control group errors had been very few, in the experimental 
groups the wrong evaluations expressed by the majority had influenced about a third of the 
judgments expressed by the critical subjects (33.2% of total responses). If it was also true that 
independence had prevailed among the critical subjects (the percentage of exact responses 
was 66.8%), what is striking is the high percentage of participants who submitted to the 
clearly wrong opinion of the majority in a substantially insignificant task. If 6 of the critical 
subjects maintained a firm position, altogether 25 people out of 31 involved claimed they 
perceived what for sure they could not have seen.  
It is also interesting to consider the behaviour shown by the critical subjects. None of them 
neglected the responses of the others and all demonstrated that they had been struck by the 
fact that a unanimity of judgment had not been reached in this simple perceptive test. The 
immediate reaction of most of the critical subjects was perplexity, unease, confusion. Some 
of them, after two or three trials in which disagreement was registered, attempted to stop 
the experiment to ask the experimenter to repeat the instructions, while others tried to speak 
with their neighbours to find out why they had given such unexpected responses. If at the 
beginning of the series of discordances the critical subjects thought that dissent was by 
chance, with the continuation of the trials they were forced to confront another unequivocal 
fact: their perception was different from that of the others. Also many of them attributed the 
cause of the disagreement not so much to the others, but rather to themselves. All of this 
shocked Asch who expected that very soon the game would be up and the experiment 
would come to nothing. What happened instead was the opposite: in the face of such a 
clearly mistaken opinion, the critical subjects did not call into question the judgments of the 
majority but tried to defend their own position or be even safer, even going so far as to 
approach the two cardboards with the lines to see better and, finally, to doubt their own 
perceptive capacity.  
One comment reported at the end of the experiment, by one of the critical subjects is 
exemplary: “I didn't think I was mistaken, but reason told me I was wrong because it was 
impossible that so many people could be wrong and that only I was right”. Even the few 
that never conform to the responses of the majority confessed that they had experienced a 
profound sense of unease and a painful uncertainty. Among these few those who resisted 
did it to hold on to the trust in themselves, through exercising internal coherence in their 
judgments. Among those who instead aligned themselves to the opinions of the majority, 
besides those no longer trusting their own visual capacity, many claimed they had felt the 
need not to be excluded from the group (“I didn't want to appear stupid”), giving less 
importance to any concern relative to what they had effectively perceived. 
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In these experiments the numerical rapport between the two sides takes centre stage. In fact 
when the sides are one to one (one accomplice and one critical subject) conformism is almost 
zero; after all we are in a situation of the type “your word against mine”. The breaking point 
comes when the rapport becomes one (critical subject) to three (accomplices); a higher 
proportion does not increase significantly the entity of conformity. When however a person 
who thinks like the critical subject is inserted in the group despite a substantial confirmed 
majority in an opposing position, conformity falls visibly. Another dissenting individual 
breaks up the unanimity and shows that it is possible to have different opinions, creating at 
the same time a psychological tension in whoever has to manifest an opinion. It is 
interesting to note that in such a predicament very few of the critical subjects interviewed 
fully appreciated the role played by the deviant judge; although admitting that his presence 
was one of support, they did not seem to realize that he had been the determining factor in 
allowing them independence of judgment. When however the accomplice of the 
experimenter was instructed to be the only one to give the wrong response, the participants 
in the experiment ridiculed him. 
2.2 The explanation of conformism 
To understand the phenomenon of conformism a distinction was advanced between 
“informational influence” and “normative influence” (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). 
The first, consisting in taking positions expressed by others to resolve doubts deriving from 
ambiguous situations, is utilized to integrate sketchy skills and so gain greater security in 
facing up to life's chores. In such a case the group offers its members informational 
influence. 
The second form of influence, pertaining to affiliation (the assumption of the norms of the 
group as an expression of the link between individuals), manifests itself in situations where 
a person intends to communicate to others a positive image of himself, or wants to avoid 
embarrassment and sanctions, like exclusion from the group. 
Both these processes of sharing norms and knowledge assume importance for the people, 
and the prevalence in exercising one or the other varies according to the situation. In fact 
they produce their psychological effects at different levels. In this way two essential forms of 
conformism originate: acquiescence, when the person externally agrees with the group to 
avoid argument, although disagreeing, and internalization, when the person conforms 
because he is trustful of the responses given by the others and so is convinced of their 
goodwill (Kelman, 1958). 
In the experiment conducted by Sherif on the autokinetic effect, the group exercised 
informative influence which induced a process of  internalization. The individual judgments 
converge towards uniform regulation decided at group level without excessive difficulty, 
since there is no chance of objectifying the perception of luminous movement, being an 
optical illusion. As with many other real ambiguous or dangerous situations people 
authentically accept the influence exercised by the group they belong to. 
In Asch's experiment, although both are present, the normative influence turns out to be 
more important than the informational one. This derives from the fact that public responses 
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suffer more from the judgment of the group with respect to those given in private, 
generating in deviants a feeling of shame (Scheff, 1988). In addition this study has shown 
above all the type of conformism known as acquiescence, since the participants regain 
independence of judgment, once separated from group pressure. In this case you can speak 
of false conformism.  
Naturally, acquiescence and internalization are not phenomena that exclude each other, 
rather they are understood to be polarities of a continuum. To do something because 
circumstances force us to do so can in fact induce a change of behaviour compared with 
what you are doing, as shown by the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). 
The “Asch effect”, to follow the norms of the group even when they are so clearly against 
the data of reality, has raised several questions. Besides explanations linked to group 
processes (informational and normative influence), some authors (for example, Berry 1967; 
Frager, 1970) have also analyzed the rapport between conformism and socialization. In fact 
different societies tend to encourage behaviour of independence rather than submission, 
and viceversa. Otherwise to attach great importance to conformism compared with norms 
fixed by unknown people. At the same time, every society is characterized by the presence 
of various sub-cultures, which can orientate its members differently with respect to the 
dominant culture. For example, homosexuals often conform to the norms of the group they 
belong to but turn out to be non-conformist compared with the remaining society of 
heterosexuals. 
Reference to homosexuals enables us to remember how, next to the influence of the 
majority, precisely in the studies of Asch, there is also an influence of the minority 
(Moscovici, 1976). Assigning a central role to social conflict, the minority, as for example 
illustrated by the history of the homosexual movement, have shown that it is possible to 
induce a change in the majority. 
3. Obedience 
If for the studies of Asch we can speak of a conformism in words the research conducted by 
Stanley Milgram (1974) on obedience describes instead how conformity comes to involve 
conduct. Obedience is a particular form of conformity: it manifests itself when the 
“majority” is not a quantitative dimension but qualitative. At the bottom of this there is a 
difference of status: the one who exercises a power superior to others operates a direct 
explicit pressure on them, who adapt to his will. 
3.1 Immoral orders and dilemmas of conscience 
“We will pay you $4.00 for one hour of your time. People needed for a study of memory”. 
With this announcement published in a local newspaper participants were recruited to the 
first of a series of experiments which signalled the story of social psychology (Milgram, 
1974). 
Those who had responded to the announcement were invited to a laboratory to carry out 
actions which became more and more in contrast with their moral conscience. What 
interested the experimenters was to understand to what point the participants would obey 
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to orders and when or how they would rebel. To make the prearranged situation credible a 
particular strategy was used: staging an experiment which had as its fictitious objective the 
study of processes of memory and learning; two participants were assigned the roles of 
teacher and learner. The experimenter informed both that it was an investigation aimed at 
investigating the effects of punishment on learning. The learner was taken into a room, 
made to sit, with hands tied in such a way as to make it evident that freedom of movement 
would be removed, while an electrode was applied on one pulse. The task of the learner 
consisted in learning a series of word associations, but for each error of memory apparently 
an electric shock was received increasing in intensity each time. 
In reality the real “experimental subject” was not the learner but rather the teacher who, 
after helping to accommodate the former, was placed in another room before a false 
electricity generator contrived with a series of modulators of intensity ranging from 15 to 
450 volts, rising on a scale by 15 volts with 30 lever switches. The instrument indicated, 
with special labels, the sequence from “light shock” to “dangerous shock”. The teacher 
had the task of subjecting the learner to the word memory test: when the latter responded 
correctly the rule was that the test passed to the subsequent series of words, while when a 
mistake was made an electric shock was administered starting from the lowest level and 
proceeding as required upwards. As an accomplice of the experimenter, the false guinea 
pig did not receive any torture but the teacher was convinced that real damage was being 
inflicted. 
The objective of the experimenter was that of observing to what point the teacher would 
agree to inflict violence on a person who manifested the will to defend himself, interrupting 
the test and unable to do it as he was tied up. The contrast between moral conscience and 
received orders was primed so that when the learner, pretending, manifested his 
discomfort: around 75 volts the first groans could be heard clearly, at 120 volts there was 
strong invective, at 150 volts the request that the experiment be suspended, finally, when the 
shocks were now reaching 285 volts excruciating gasps. How did the teachers behave? The 
results were surprising. Although manifesting tension and protesting energetically, 65% of 
the participants continued to punish the learner to the last beat. The groans and imploring of 
the victim were insufficient to make them desist from carrying out the orders of the 
experimenter. 
What has just been described illustrates the standard condition of the experiment and the 
general results obtained but, to understand the problems faced better, it is opportune to 
analyze the different experimental modifications introduced to identify which conditions 
influence the behaviour of obedience. Milgram conducted several variations on his baseline 
study and found that obedience was maximized when participants merely assisted someone 
else giving the electric shocks (92.5%) and when they first observed a peer complying with 
the experimenter until the end (68.75%) (Milgram, 1974).  
From these variations of situational stimuli, an important element regards the closeness of 
teacher and learner: the data show that there is an inversely proportional rapport between 
the tendency to inflict electric shocks and the proximity of the victim. As can be seen from 
table 1, Milgram arranged four different experimental conditions; if we observe how many 
participants arrived at the extreme point, corresponding to the most dangerous shocks, we 
www.intechopen.com
 
Conformity, Obedience, Disobedience: The Power of the Situation 
 
281 
note that the percentage of obedient participants follow the course of the levels of proximity. 
In fact the closer the teacher gets to the learner, until they touch, the less the phenomenon of 
obedience to the orders of the experimenter is registered. It can be affirmed that closeness of 
the victim, on the perceptive plane, increases the link between action and consequence, 
raising personal responsibility for the suffering inflicted. The principal morals that guide the 
action thus seem to be subject to the laws of proximity and distance. To act with ferocity 
towards a nearby or faraway victim certainly does not change the moral quality of the 
action; in spite of this intervention in the spatial rapport profoundly affects the disposition 
towards obedience. Therefore every element that reduces the proximity between action and 
victim inhibits the voice of conscience and makes the execution of the violent task easier.  
 
 
 
 
EXTREME 
POINT OF 
OBEDIENCE 
 
(Shocks XXX) 
(435-450 volts) 
 
REMOTE 
VOICE 
FEEDBACK 
 
PROXIMITY 
TOUCH 
PROXIMITY 
 
The victim is not 
visible or audible
 
The victim is not 
visible and only 
his groans can be 
heard 
 
The victim is in 
the same room as 
the person 
administering the 
electric shocks 
 
The victim 
receives the 
shocks only if his 
arm is pushed by 
the teacher on a 
metal plate 
 
% Participants 65.0% 62.5% 40.0% 30.0% 
Table 1. Rapport between the proximity “teacher-learner” and level of obedience in 
Milgram's studies. 
Even when the experimenter behaves incorrectly, reaching preliminary agreement less with 
respect to the moment of interruption of the experiment, most of the teachers respected their 
decisions of authority. Already evident is that the substance of the order is not so important 
as its origin; in fact, in the situation where roles are manipulated it turned out that any man 
placed in the role of the experimenter was unable to obtain obedience and when the part of 
the learner was recited by the experimenter, the moment the latter asked that the 
experiment be suspended, all participants stopped, disregarding the orders given by any 
man, while 65% of teachers continued when the commands were given by another 
experimenter: the orders of a source without authority had no power. 
3.2 The explanation of destructive obedience 
The explanation adopted by Milgram (1974) to understand the results of his research is 
founded on the concept of agentic state. A person inserted in an authoritarian system passes 
from an autonomous state to an agent state since he no longer feels free to act and considers 
himself as an agent who must satisfy the requirements of others, accepting the definition of 
the situation provided by authority. Thus a subject finds himself in an agentic state when he 
is willing to regulate his conduct according to directives coming from a person of higher 
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status. In this condition the individual is no longer considered responsible for his own 
actions but is defined as an instrument to carry out the orders of others (Zamperini, 2003).  
The root of behaviour of obedience is however singled out by Milgram outside the 
experimental context, calling socialization into question: the role of the family structure, 
school, institutions as agents that promote teaching of rules of obedience. And science does 
not escape similar considerations: the figure of the scientist, cloaked in prestige and 
superiority thanks to social legitimization, induces respect and acceptance. 
The experimental model of Milgram is known also by the term “Eichmann experiment”, 
since the condition in which participants are found evokes something analogous in the 
activity of this nazi bureaucrat, who from one side of a desk, absorbed in the work to be 
carried out, organized the expedition of trains loaded with Jews, destined for the 
extermination camps. Without drawing any equivalence between the participants in these 
experiments and those marked with collective atrocities these studies have, in any case, 
provided important indications in order to understand human behaviour in extreme 
situations like the Holocaust (for a critical review, Miller, 2004). The power of the situation 
in transforming ordinary people into torturers ready to commit acts of violence has also 
been analyzed by Kelman and Hamilton (1989). The authors give the name “binding forces” 
to all those elements of a situation that psychologically bind an individual to the definition 
of the reality provided by authority. The power of these forces is emphasized by the 
presence of numerous factors: the pressure of a group of equals, being watched, finding 
oneself involved in an ambiguous or new situation, the existence of a chain of command 
(like the military hierarchy), the grave consequences in case of disobedience. The massacres 
of civilians perpetrated by soldiers, as in the slaughter of My Lai during the Vietnam war, 
represent a tragic manifestation of similar forces. 
The rapport of power between the dominant and the subordinate is shown effectively by a 
famous simulation: the imprisonment study of Philip Zimbardo (for a detailed summary,  
Zimbardo, 2007). In the simulated prison set up in the rooms of Stanford University, 
whoever wore the guard's uniform became aggressive while those who wore that of the 
prisoner took on an apathetic manner. This condition would have induced a psychological 
feeling of de-individualization, since the uniforms caused anonymity and loss of awareness 
of oneself. This seems to show that social roles may have a powerful effect on our 
behaviour. The guards are invested with authority and expect obedience. The expectation of 
role of the prisoners is obedience. In the study it does not just turn out that the latter obey 
the former but that all of them obey their social role (Zamperini, 2004).  
3.3 Administrative obedience 
In Milgram's study we are in the presence of conduct which (apparently) causes physical 
suffering, but we know that there are forms of violence and oppression that produce less 
visible damage and perhaps, just for this reason, are more insidious and worrying. The 
problem was confronted in a series of experiments on administrative obedience conducted 
in the eighties at Utrecht University, in Holland (Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1995). 
The participants were asked to administer an enrolment test to an unemployed person and, 
to enable the scientist to collect data for personal research, completely unrelated to the 
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selection process, they had to create a degree of psychological tension so as to cause a very 
poor performance. In this way the unemployed person lost any chance of obtaining the job 
he had applied for. 
Comparing results obtained using the violence administered with those of Milgram, it 
turned out that in the first condition a greater level of obedience was achieved with respect 
to the second. It is the type of violence that enables us to understand this difference: physical 
violence (Milgram's experiments) is more direct and therefore more difficult to apply 
compared with the more indirect psychological-administrative violence. It was also shown 
that the participants were able to oppose authority: when they had to sign beforehand a 
declaration that made them legally responsible to the unemployed person, there was a 
significant reduction in the degree of obedience. 
The explanation for the results are collocated in the theoretical perspective of Milgram, 
calling into question the status of agent and thus the psychological change inherent in the 
responsibility perceived in the participants. The experimenter is a representative of social 
institutions, authorized to act in a certain way and in a certain direction, while the 
unemployed person is perceived as a neutral and insignificant individual. For this reason 
the participants feel no emotional involvement with the victim and let themselves be guided 
by an institution considered legitimate. 
4. Ethical issues and the (limited) validity of scenario studies 
As we have seen from the above analysis, it seems difficult for people not to obey in the 
presence of an authority figure perceived as legitimate. Although social psychologists know 
much about this pervasive phenomenon — particularly with regard to the role of situational 
influences —, they would have known even more if ethics committees within universities or 
research institutions, established to protect the rights of human subjects, had not 
discouraged them from extending Milgram’s research because of the stress experienced by 
participants. In the end, stricter ethical standards placed studies using procedures similar to 
Milgram’s out of bounds — the last methodological replication was made in Austria, in the 
eighties, by Grete Schurz (Schurz, 1985).  
Diana Baumrind was one of Milgram’s most severe critics. In a famous article published in 
the American Psychologist, Baumrind (1964) argued that the extreme stress and emotional 
conflict described by Milgram could have easily modified the participants’ self-image 
and/or their ability to trust authority figures in the future. Perhaps only an intense 
corrective interpersonal experience could have helped the subject to recover after such a 
distressing event. Without it, Baumrind expected a sensitive individual to remain hurt and 
anxious for some time, and a cynical subject to become even more alienated and distrustful. 
Similar critics and concerns for the welfare of subjects who served in the Milgram’s 
experiment were expressed in the following years by several other scholars (Kaufmann, 
1967; Mixon, 1972).  
In his defense, Milgram (1964) claimed that the stress experienced by participants dissipated 
quickly and was not injurious — when, a year after the research program was completed, a 
medical examiner interviewed 40 experimental subjects, no evidence was found of any 
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traumatic reactions. Also, follow-up data indicated that many participants not only felt 
gratified to have taken part in that study but said they viewed their participation as an 
opportunity to learn something important about themselves and wanted to be in further 
experimental research.  
Milgram’s arguments were not enough to put an end to the controversy. From that point on, 
social researchers interested in exploring the mechanisms of obedience have relied upon 
their creativity to set up experimental paradigms able to minimize participants’ emotional 
strain. Electric shocks were then replaced with verbal insults (Bocchiaro & Zimbardo, 2010; 
Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1986), the real victim with a puppy (Sheridan & King, 1972) or with a 
(female) virtual human (Slater et al., 2006), and the intimidating laboratory settings with 
more familiar, real world ones (Bickman, 1974; Hofling et al., 1966).  
Recently, a partial replication of Milgram’s experiment was conducted in the United States 
by Jerry Burger (2009). Burger received approval from his university ethics committee by 
modifying several of the experimental protocols in order to reduce the emotional discomfort 
experienced by participants. First, through several screenings (tests and interviews), he 
rejected people who might have negative reactions to participating in the study. Second, 
participants were given a milder sample shock (15 volts) rather than in the Milgram study 
(45 volts). Third, and most important, Burger stopped the procedure at 150 volts, when the 
learner-confederate protested for the first time and clearly said he wanted out because of the 
excessive pain. The 150-volt solution was based on previous analyses showing that 79% of 
Milgram’s subjects (Exp. 5; see Milgram, 1974) who had followed the experimenter’s orders 
at this level went on until the last shock. As noted by Burger, knowing people’s reactions to 
the 150-volt point allows one to estimate what they would do if allowed to continue, 
without exposing them to the extreme tension exhibited by Milgram’s participants.  
What did Burger find 45 years after Milgram? Despite the important historical and cultural 
changes that have occurred over four decades, the power of authority figures to claim 
people’s allegiance and obedience remains very strong: 70% of participants obeyed until the 
end. Milgram, at the same point in his most comparable condition, had found 82.5%, but 
such a difference does not come close to statistical significance — in comparing these 
percentages, it is crucial to consider also that Burger had implemented a few procedural 
changes that should have made it easier to disobey. 
Results obtained by Burger are not surprising: correlational analyses conducted by Blass 
(1999) on 24 studies spanning a period of 22 years (from 1963 to 1985) clearly indicate that 
the rates of obedience show no systematic change over time. These findings, taken together, 
provide indirect evidence against the “enlightenment effects” thesis proposed by social 
psychologist Kenneth Gergen (1973). According to Gergen, “sophistication as to 
psychological principles liberates one from their behavioral implications” (1973, p. 313). If 
Gergen is right, participants in the more recent studies would have been more familiar with 
Milgram’s work and thereby become enlightened about the demands of authority; as a 
consequence, the later studies should have found lower rates of obedience than the earlier 
ones. A more direct test of the “enlightenment effects” thesis was provided by a study in 
which participants were asked to serve as experimenters and oversee a “teacher” who had 
to teach a verbal-learning task to a “learner” by using increasing shocks as punishment on 
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each mistake (Shelton, 1982). As the shock levels escalated, the teacher, who unbeknownst to 
the experimenter-participant was a confederate, “expressed uneasiness, then became quite 
anxious, angry, on the verge of tears; cursed, complained of stomach pains, asked for a glass 
of water, and pleaded with the experimenter to stop the session …” (p. 31). Although 
participants had first been given a synopsis of the obedience experiment — in Gergen’s 
words, they had been “enlightened” —, 92% of them continued to command the teacher to 
keep increasing the voltage to the maximum level. As noted by Blass (1999): 
…contrary to what is implied by Gergen’s “enlightenment effects” notion, knowledge 
does not or cannot always lead to action. Being enlightened about the unexpected 
power of authority may help a person to stay away from an authority-dominated 
situation, but once he or she is already in such a situation, knowledge of the drastic 
degree of obedience that authorities are capable of eliciting does not necessarily help to 
free the individual from the grip of the forces operating in that concrete situation; that 
is, to defy the authority in charge. (p. 971)  
The aforementioned stringent ethical standards, besides hindering research on obedience, 
have indirectly delayed the systematic investigation of the socially positive aspects of the 
interaction individual-unjust authority, notably disobedience and whistle-blowing — we 
will talk about them in the next paragraph—, investigation that would seem to be essential 
for understanding some preconditions of social/political revolutions. Our knowledge about 
“rebellious” individuals is gradually increasing, but there are still no clear cut answers to 
basic questions: do disobedient people/whistleblowers have special values or personality 
traits? Or why do they choose to defy unjust authority/to report the misconduct to higher 
authorities?  
In order to resolve the ethical controversy and find answers to these important questions, 
some social scientists feel that scenario studies are a viable methodology (King, 1997; Sims 
& Keenan, 1998). Basically, in scenario studies participants are presented with a detailed 
description of a given situation, asked to reflect carefully on it and, finally, to predict their 
behaviour. It is a research method that can be appropriate and useful when respondents 
are asked to predict their own behaviour under situations that have been experienced 
frequently. Predictions in these cases will likely be correct because based on people’s 
personal histories. On the contrary, complex and unfamiliar circumstances have a flavor 
that is hard to grasp by simply imagining them; as a logical result, respondents are 
especially inaccurate in guessing what they would do. Also, as correctly noted by Miceli 
and colleagues (2008), would people accurately report their behaviour, or would they 
report what they believe most others will view favorably? Or would they give the 
researcher the responses they believe would support his/her hypotheses rather than their 
“real” feelings? 
Before the study was conducted, Milgram (1963) had provided 14 psychology graduate 
students with a detailed description of his experimental paradigm on obedience, then asked 
them to predict the behaviour of one hundred hypothetical Americans of various ages and 
occupations who were placed in that situation. Students predicted that about 1% of the 
subjects would continue to obey to the end. The same question was posed informally to a 
group of experts, professors of psychology and psychiatry, and again the prediction was 
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that virtually all participants would refuse to go on at a certain point of the procedure. As 
you remember, in Milgram’s baseline condition 65% of participants turned out to be fully 
obedient to the authority. Similarly, Bocchiaro and colleagues (2011) found a striking 
difference between estimated and observed data. Their experimental paradigm allowed 
participants to deal with an unreasonable, unethical request by the experimenter-authority 
with options of obeying, disobeying, or blowing the whistle. In the scenario study, only 3.6% 
of total respondents (138 undergraduate students) indicated they would obey; by contrast, 
most believed they would be either disobedient, 31.9%, or whistleblowers, 64.5%. Data from 
the laboratory presented a very different picture: 76.5% of participants (a separate sample of 
149 undergraduate students) obeyed the experimenter, 14.1% disobeyed, and 9.4% 
challenged the alleged unethical nature of the experiment by reporting the misconduct of 
the experimenter to higher authorities. 
Far from launching a generic attack on scenario studies, we want to point out again that it is 
feasible for social scientists to use this research method when they want to explore human 
behaviour in situations that are familiar to respondents. Otherwise, it is more appropriate to 
use or develop research paradigms that (a) allow for the analysis of spontaneous reactions to 
events that are real in the participants’ eyes and that (b) protect their psychological and 
emotional well-being. The 150-volt solution proposed by Burger is a valid contribution in 
this direction. In the next paragraph we will see a few more. 
5. Resisting to social pressures: Disobedient people and whistleblowers 
It is worth noting that, independent of the procedure used, all studies on obedience 
invariably report a percentage of participants that defy the authority (Hofling et al., 1966; 
Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1986; Sheridan & King, 1972; Slater et al., 2006). This defiant decision, 
at least in Milgram-style experiments, appears most likely at the critical point when the 
victim’s first requests to terminate the study (Gilbert, 1981; Packer, 2008). Other subsequent 
analyses, this time performed on Milgram’s “Bridgeport” condition (his second laboratory 
site in an office suite in Bridgeport, Connecticut), reveal that the earlier in the procedure 
subjects begin to oppose the experimenter (by questioning or objecting to his demands), the 
more likely they are to end up defiant (Modigliani & Rochat, 1995). “Thus it appears that the 
timing of a participant’s first firm opposition is important in shaping final outcomes. Firm, 
early opposition seems to be a sufficient condition for successful defiance, and, not 
surprisingly, total lack of such firm opposition is a sufficient condition for ending up 
obedient” (Rochat et al., 2000, p. 171). 
Monin and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that moral rebels — “individuals who take a 
principled stand against the status quo, who refuse to comply, stay silent, or simply go 
along when this would require that they compromise their values” (pp. 76-77) — often do 
not receive the respect they deserve. In a series of studies, such rebel behaviour turned out 
to elicit resentment and rejection in those participants who had not taken this brave course 
of action, implicitly perceived as an indictment of their own misconduct. As a further, 
indirect proof of the validity of these results, the authors report comments made at 
debriefing by Milgram’s obedient participants on those who had disobeyed (1965, Study 2): 
they were “ridiculous” (p. 132), they “lost all control of themselves” (p. 132), and “they came 
here for an experiment, and I think they should have stuck with it” (p. 132). 
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More recently, Bocchiaro and Zimbardo (2010), through a research paradigm modeled after 
that of the Utrecht studies (Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1986), tried to cast some light on the 
psychological factors involved in fostering disobedience. In this study, the participant, 
called “coach”, was asked to assist a “performer”(confederate) in solving a sequence of 
syllogisms. The task for the performer was to find the logical conclusions, for the coach to 
give critical feedback in case of mistake. Critical feedback consisted of a graded series of 
negative comments and rude remarks. For example, a mild criticism was “You are going 
bad…”, a moderate feedback was “You are really ridiculous!”, and an extremely negative 
feedback was “You are really the most stupid person I have ever seen!”. The performer 
solved only 4 of the 19 syllogisms, mostly at the beginning. His emotive reactions were also 
predetermined and their intensity increased as critical feedback turned more hostile.  
The results of this exploratory study revealed that 70% of participants (Italian 
undergraduate students) disobeyed the unjust authority at the victim’s first request to be 
released (the confederate pretended to suffer a lot and shouted that he wanted to leave) — 
such a high level of disobedience was mainly due to the combination of condition 
“proximity of teacher to learner” with “remote authority”. The study also showed 
similarities between obedient and disobedient participants: the two groups were 
equivalent in terms of personality traits, stress reactions to the experimental setting, and 
verbal dissent (form and frequency) towards authority. Among the disobedient 
participants, post-experimental interviews revealed their decision to be impulsive, and 
believed to be the most obvious for anyone to make in that situation. Moreover, 
disobedience turned out to be typically motivated by emergent empathy for the victim-
confederate (“I felt pity for him”) and, to a lesser extent, by moral/ethical considerations 
(“I stopped because it didn’t seem fair to me to go on in those conditions. I wouldn’t have 
had a clear conscience”).  
In another study (Bocchiaro et al., 2011), conducted in the basement of the VU University of 
Amsterdam, participants were asked by the experimenter-authority to write and sign a brief 
statement to convince their fellow students and friends to participate in an experiment on 
sensory deprivation to be done at the VU University. The experiment appeared immediately 
unethical: in a similar one, allegedly carried out in Rome (allegedly, as no experiment had 
actually been done), subjects had panicked, experienced visual and auditory hallucinations, 
and described the experience as a frightening one. Two participants had even asked the 
researchers to stop because of their strong symptoms.  
Besides the possibility to disobey the experimenter’s request to write the statement in support 
of the sensory deprivation experiment, participants had the opportunity to report his 
misconduct by putting a form in the “research committee” box. As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, 76.5% of participants obeyed, 14.1% disobeyed, and 9.4% blew the whistle. 
When considered retrospectively, the decision to disobey seemed fairly obvious to 
participants: 81% of disobedient subjects stated it had been “easy” for them to act that way, 
mainly because of their perception of the obviously unethical aspects of the sensory 
deprivation experiment. Such a perception of “easiness” was also linked with a firm 
resolution not to involve other people. The dominant feeling, at the end, was one of “pride” 
(52.4%), and of “relief” (28.6%). 
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Obeying was considered an easy path as well. Authority of the experimenter (34.2%), 
importance of scientific research (17.5%), and money (16.7%) were the factors that, in that 
order, contributed most in making such a decision. In sharp contrast, it was mainly the wish 
to protect their own friends (52.4%) and the ethically unacceptable sensory deprivation 
experiment (14.3%) that triggered participants’ disobedience.  
When asked about the thoughts that went through their mind before choosing what to do, 
many disobedient participants (42.9%) thought about how “not fair” the sensory 
deprivation experiment was (“It is unethical… it goes against my principles”). As regards 
their feelings, a clear sense of uneasiness was experienced by 47.6% of disobedient 
participants (“I felt under pressure, morally oppressed”, “I got a strange feeling in my 
gut”). 
The pattern of responses given by obedient participants proved to be more articulated: some 
of them (18.4%) were confused about what to do (“Would it be weird to stop?”, “Shall I get 
up and leave?”), others (14.9%) concentrated on their friends (“I thought to warn my fellow 
students before they would receive that message”, “What are they going to do with the 
friends I wrote down?”), and some others (6.1%) were preoccupied with the task (“My 
thoughts went to the message… how to write a good and short piece”). Almost one third of 
obedient participants (30.7%) experienced conflicting feelings before deciding to comply 
(“On the one side I did want to help the experimenter, but on the other I did not want to 
involve my friends”), whereas 23.7% explicitly claimed to have felt “uneasy” (“I did get a 
nasty feeling”, “I was uneasy because I had the idea that it was not ethically correct”). This 
same feeling of uneasiness accompanied the act of writing the statement for the 
experimenter by 30.7%. However, this figure grew to 48.2% when the categories “uneasy”, 
“guilty”, and “forced, used” were combined.  
Subjects were also specifically asked whether they had realized that, in writing the 
statement, they were lying. Only 47.4% of respondents said “yes.” Even so, they continued 
for one of the following reasons: “People who would receive the message still have the 
freedom to choose what to do” (25.9%), “authority of the experimenter” (14.8%), “already 
committed to the task” (14.8%), value of “science” (9.3%), and the “possibility to adapt the 
message” (9.3%). All the remaining answers were included in the category “other”. Those 
who had said “I did not realize I was lying” actually resorted to a mechanism of denial. 
They stated that they just left out crucial information, adapted the message, withheld 
information – but actually they did not.  
In general, disobedient participants stated they were not worried about possible negative 
effects arising from their behavior (“no money” was the worst consequence for 28.6% of 
those who disobeyed). Surprisingly, the same lack of consequential concern was true of 
many obedient participants: most of them were not concerned because “people who would 
receive the message still have the freedom to choose what to do” (38.8%), because “these 
people can be warned in advance” (28.8%), or because “the last word is up to the Research 
Committee” (10.%).  
Finally, disobedient participants were asked why, although they refused to comply, they 
refrained from going further to denounce the authority misconduct by reporting it to the 
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higher authorities. Many of them (42.9%) answered that, by opposing the experimenter, they 
had already done their duty (“I thought it did not apply to me”). Others (19%) made 
reference to the experimenter (“I would have felt guilty”, “The mail box looked like it could 
be opened by the experimenter”), whereas 14.3% refrained from blowing the whistle 
because in any case the Research Committee would monitor the experiment (“The Research 
Committee was informed, so…”).  
What about the whistleblowers? Before going into details of their post-experimental 
responses, it is probably useful to present here the whistle-blowing phenomenon. 
Whistleblower is a general term applied to anyone who discloses illegal, immoral or 
illegitimate practices under the control of his/her employer to persons or organizations that 
may be able to effect remedial action (Near & Miceli, 1985). Although protected by a number 
of laws (at least in some countries), the act of reporting internal wrongdoing is clearly 
demanding for people: a prospective whistleblower, in fact, is typically concerned about 
ostracism, harassment, blame, demotion, discharge. Moreover, there is no warranty that the 
unlawful practices will be corrected, especially when the correction is costly, damages the 
reputation of the company or institution, or when there is a culture of complicity from top 
down in the company or system of control.  
Miethe (1999) noted that the act of blowing the whistle is often followed by bankruptcy, 
depression, and alcoholism, whereas Alford (2001) found that somewhere between half and 
two-thirds of the whistleblowers lose their jobs — they rarely get them back and most will 
never work in that field because of informal blacklists spread across sister organizations. But 
usually they are not fired outright. “The organization’s goal is to disconnect the act of 
whistleblowing from the act of retaliation, which is why so much legislation to protect the 
whistleblower is practically irrelevant. The usual practice is to demoralize and humiliate the 
whistleblower, putting him or her under so much psychological stress that it becomes 
difficult to do a good job. If the whistleblower is under enough stress, he or she is likely to 
make a bad decision, justifying disciplinary actions.” (Alford, 2001, pp. 31-32).  
Retaliation seems then a key element in the whistleblowing phenomenon. It can be work-
related or social — the first being tangible and formal whereas the second more informal 
and  undocumented in employment records — and it is inversely associated with the 
whistleblower’s power and credibility (Near & Miceli, 1987). However, “where the 
organization depends heavily on the wrongdoer or the wrongdoing itself, even a whistle-
blower with high status may not have sufficient relative power to escape retaliation” (Miceli 
et al., 2008, p. 104). 
Having said all that, it is not surprising that only a small minority of people is willing to 
perform such an extraordinary act. The value of this percentage will depend on situational 
factors (seriousness and type of wrongdoing, characteristics of the organization, wrongdoer 
power) more than on personality traits (see Miceli et al., 2008). Regarding this latter point, 
research reveals that whistleblowers are not different in terms of personality traits or 
personal values from those who chose not to report the observed wrongdoing (Near & 
Miceli, 1996). This lack of difference may sound somewhat strange at first, as one might 
expect a whistleblower being more altruistic, courageous, empathetic than the rest of the 
people. It is not like this. Of course, there must be personal variables that distinguish 
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between “categories” of individuals, but the psychological tests so far used by psychologists 
are probably not so subtle to pick up such difference. 
Let us go back to data. In the post-experimental interviews collected by Bocchiaro and 
colleagues (2011), 78.6% of whistleblowers stated it had been an easy decision, followed by a 
feeling of “pride” (42.9%), and of “relief” (35.7%). Whistleblowers declared that they were 
not worried about possible effects arising from their behavior, and that their decision was 
almost entirely a matter of principle of fairness and justice. When asked about the thoughts 
that went through their mind before choosing what to do, whistleblowers were mainly 
focused (57.1%) on the moral “rightness” of the decision they were about to make (“I 
thought I would do something good by sending the form”). As regards their feelings, a clear 
sense of uneasiness was experienced by 57.1% of them (“I was scared, my hands started to 
shake”, “I felt used”).  
It is important to note that no statistically significant differences were found among 
whistleblowers, obedient, and disobedient participants in any of the personality factors 
measured. Also, no significant differences were found in any of these groups in relation to 
religious affiliation, religious involvement, or gender.  
6. Conclusion 
We opened this chapter by noting that conformism and obedience are essential elements in 
maintaining social order. However, as clearly demonstrated by Solomon Asch and Stanley 
Milgram in the controlled setting of a laboratory, the desire to conform and obey can lead 
ordinary people into even mistrust their own experiences or inflict serious harm on others. 
The implicit message is that, in certain contexts, apparently simple situational factors are 
more powerful than personality traits in shaping human behaviour.  
The good news is that these same situational factors can be manipulated to stimulate people 
to act in a positive way. In other words, virtually anyone, independently of his/her 
personality structure, can overcome social pressures toward conformity and obedience. 
Although we expect many social psychologists to agree with us, our statement may appear 
provocative or even absurd to those who think that behaviours stem from a specific 
constellation of personality: for them, we assume, rebels must be more courageous than 
others or must have been nurtured properly, in a supportive environment, by parents or 
teachers. This reasoning is surely plausible, but at present there is insufficient evidence to 
support it. To us, it seems much more reasonable to argue that nonconformers, disobedients, 
and whistleblowers are ordinary people whose action is extraordinary, and that some of 
them, if not many, are unlikely to engage in another disobedient act given that the first one 
was situationally-specific.  
It is essential to understand the forces that catalyse people from passive bystanders to 
active responders able to challenge immorality and injustice. To do that, we call for 
studies that, while protecting the welfare and dignity of individuals, explore the 
foundation of defiance both in the person and in the situation. On the one hand, social 
researchers should make use of more refined psychological measures to capture even the 
most subtle difference between categories of people; on the other, they should 
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systematically manipulate a set of variables to develop in the participants a sense of 
personal responsibility, morality, and pressure necessary for disobeying and blowing the 
whistle. Also, it would be important to manipulate the power held by the authority figure 
and observe whether, and to which extent, different typologies of power shape the 
participants’ behavior. 
If conformism and obedience are basic elements in our culture, nonconformity, 
disobedience, and whistle-blowing are vital for its progress.  
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